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COMMENTS
Pennsylvania's Lockout Exception to the
Labor Dispute Disqualification from
Unemployment Compensation Benefits:
Federal Challenges and Issues*
I.

Introduction
An increasingly important dimension has been added to the
labor-management bargaining process: the availability of public benefits to employees during labor disputes. Although availability of
public benefits during labor disputes can be traced to the 1930's,'
analysis of this state action has only recently been undertaken through
court challenges.2 These challenges allege that payment of welfare
and unemployment benefits to strikers distorts collective bargaining
and disrupts the labor-management balance established by federal
labor laws. Payment of unemployment compensation to strikers is
even a greater evil because the benefits paid to striking employees are
* Editor's note.-Immediately before the final printing of this comment, the
Hawaiian Telephone case, see notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra, was decided
on the merits. The federal district court declared illegal any construction of Hawaii's
unemployment compensation law that allowed benefits to strikers. In an opinion by
Chief Judge Pence the court found, inter alia, that the availability of unemployment
benefits tends to prolong strikes and force employers to settle when they otherwise
would not. Therefore, the Hawaii statute palpably affected labor relations between
Hawaiian Telephone and its employees' union. Indeed, the court found that the
statute's detrimental effect pervades every Hawaiian collective bargaining conflict.
The case will be analyzed and related to this comment in the Winter 1976 issue of
the Dickinson Law Review.
1. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration, under the direction of
Harry Hopkins, authorized relief in 1933-34 to "needy unemployed" regardless of
their participation in labor disputes. This policy met strenuous opposition from
employers. A. THIEBLOT & R. CowIN, WELFARE AND STRIKES: THE USE OF PUBLIC
FUNDS To SUPPORT STRIKERS 34-36 (1972) [hereinafter cited as THIEBLOT & COWIN].
2. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973); ITT v. Minter,
435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor & Indus.
Rel., 378 F. Supp. 791 (D. Hawaii 1974); Dow Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 57 F.R.D. 105
(E.D. Mich. 1972); Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970); Borger
Steel Co. v. Smith, Civil No. 74-636 (M.D. Pa., filed Aug. 5, 1974); Holland Motor
Express, Inc. v. Michigan Employ. Sec. Comm'n, 42 Mich. App. 19, 201 N.W.2d 308
(1972); Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review v. Sun Oil Co., - Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. -, 338 A.2d 710 (1975).
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provided by struck employers.' These employer challenges also contend that a state's payment of benefits is an unconstitutional intrusion
into an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
This comment will examine the availability of unemployment
compensation benefits in labor disputes, federal and state unemployment compensation statutes, and decisions interpreting those laws.
Next, recent court challenges to payment of public benefits to strikers
and locked out employees will be explored. Finally, issues and arguments involved in these challenges will be discussed. Although this
comment focuses primarily on Pennsylvania law, its scope encompasses other states with similar statutory provisions.
II.

The Statutory Background

In response to the Great Depression, a comprehensive social
insurance program was adopted by Congress in 1935.1 One of the
areas addressed was unemployment compensation. The states, however, were reluctant to enact similar legislation, partially from fear
that industry in states without such legislation would gain a competitive edge.' As an incentive title III of the Social Security Act6 provided
federal monies to states for administration of those unemployment
insurance programs approved by the Secretary of Labor. Title IX of
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act 7 imposed an excise tax on
certain employers. Computed by a percentage of total wages paid by
the employer, this tax granted credits for sums the employer had
already paid into an approved state fund. As a further incentive to
states to enact programs of unemployment insurance, the Committee
on Economic Security 8 prepared several draft bills9 to guide state
3. Although welfare assistance is provided by state and federal taxes, only
employers pay unemployment compensation tax. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 781 (Supp.

1975).
4.

Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620.

5.

STATUTORY

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:

INCOME SECURrrY 31-32 (R.

Stevens ed. 1970); see generally SOCIAL SEcuRrY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY IN
AMERICA (1937). As a result of this reluctance, Wisconsin was the only state to enact
such legislation before 1935: WIS.STAT. ANN. 8H 108.01-.24, Spl. S. 1931, ch. 20, § 2.
6. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, tit. III, §8 301-04, 49 Stat. 626.
7. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 438.
8. The Economic Security Committee was created by President Roosevelt in
June 1934 to study problems and make proposals relating to economic security.
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 64-65 (R. Stevens ed.
1970).
9. For an examination of the draft bills see Shadur, Unemployment Benefits
and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. CmI. L. REv. 194, 195 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Shadur].

legislation. These efforts proved successful since all forty-eight states
had enacted unemployment compensation statutes by mid-1937.10
A.

Definition of Labor Disputes and Lockouts

The draft bills formulated by the Economic Security Committee
and subsequent state legislation looked to the British program of
unemployment insurance, the National Health Insurance Act of
1911,"1 as a model. The British statute disqualified an employee to
receive unemployment compensation benefits if he was unemployed
because of a labor dispute. Every American state copied this labor
dispute disqualification in its unemployment compensation statute,
but different definitions for its terms were developed.
The majority of states currently provide that an employee is
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits during a work stoppage
due to a labor dispute.' 2 Most states define labor dispute as a strike,
lockout, or other controversy between employer and employee without regard to the merits of the dispute. 3 British authority 1 4 and a
leading American case' 5 disqualify employees in a labor dispute from
benefits regardless of which side is responsible for the work stoppage.
The term "lockout" is almost universally included in the definition of labor dispute. 6 Section 787 of the Restatement of Torts
defines lockout as an employer's withholding of work from employees
in order to gain economic concessions and as the employer's counterpart of a strike. 1 7 Federal labor legislation, specifically the NorrisLaGuardia Act'" and the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA),19 defines labor dispute as a controversy concerning the
terms and conditions of employment. By implication this definition
covers lockouts as well as strikes. Other federal legislation is even
clearer. The Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax Act 20 provides
10. Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L.
REv. 668, 670 (1958).
11. l&2Geo.5,c.55.

12.

Manpower Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Comparison of State

Unemployment Insurance Laws 4-41 (3d rev. ed., Sept. 1, 1973).
13. Lewis, The Concept of Labor Dispute in State Unemployment Insurance

Laws, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L REv. 29, 30-31 (1966).
14.
187, 192
15.
16.

See Wagner, Unemployment Benefits in Labor Disputes, 53 DIcK. L. REV.
n.21 (1949).
In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wash. 2d 204, 130 P.2d 64 (1942).
See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 787, comment a (1939).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
19. Id. § 152(9). The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides,
The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

The Taft-Hartley Act is identical, except for the addition of tenure as an area of
controversy.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (5) (A) (1964).
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that no state shall deprive an otherwise eligible individual of unemployment benefits if he refuses to accept new work when the position
offered is vacant because of a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute.
Pennsylvania labor statutes follow these federal definitions closely. 2
Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have adopted the Restatement of
Torts definition of lockout: the counterpart of a strike.2 2
B.

Pennsylvania'sLockout Exception

Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation law phrases its labor dispute disqualification as follows:
An employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week
-. . .(d) In which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work, which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) at the factory, establishment
or other premises at which he
23
is or was last employed.

The original act 24 used the term "industrial dispute." The act was
amended in 1945 to allow an employee to receive compensation
after a four week waiting period even though he voluntarily stopped
working. 25 Another amendment in 1947 repealed the waiting period
provision and substituted "labor dispute" for "industrial dispute."2
The parenthetical words "other than a lockout" became part of the
unemployment compensation law through a further amendment in
1949.27
21. Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation law, like those of most other
states, Shadur, supra note 9, at 300, defines suitable work to exclude a position
offered that has been vacated by a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 753(1)(t) (1964). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Law,
PA. STAT. ANN.tit.
43, § 206(c) (1964), uses a definition of labor dispute virtually
identical to that used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
22. E.g., Glen Alden Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 189 Pa.
Super. 286, 291, 150 A.2d 591, 594 (1959); Byerly v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 171 Pa. Super. 303, 308, 90 A.2d 322, 325 (1952); Hogan v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 554, 560, 83 A.2d 386, 390 (1951).
23. PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d) (1964).
24. Act of December 5, 1936 (2d Exec. Sess.), P.L. 2897, No. 1, § 402.
25. Act of May 29, 1945, P.L. 1145, No. 408, § 9.
26. Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1186, No. 493, § 2. For a discussion of these
amendments and the waiting period provision see MacPhail, Meaning of the Term
Labor Dispute in the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, 54 DIcK. L.
Rv. 205 (1950).
27. Act of May 23, 1949, P.L. 1738, No. 530, § 11. The definition of labor
dispute was examined in Midvale v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 165 Pa.
Super. 359, 67 A.2d 380 (1949). The superior court found that the 1947 amendment
included both strikes and lockouts and that employees were disqualified regardless of
who initiated the work stoppage. The 1949 amendment was inapplicable to Midvale
because the dispute arose before its enactment. The court supported its definition of
labor dispute by reasoning that the 1949 amendment would have been unnecessary
had lockouts not previously been included. id. at 367-68, 67 A.2d at 384-85.

Part of the controversy over Pennslyvania's definition of labor
dispute involves the question of fault. "The fundamental idea of the
Act is to provide a reserve fund to be used for the benefit of persons
' Fault is not
unemployed through no fault of their own."28
determined
by objectively examining the merits of the dispute between the parties. 9 Rather, fault is placed on the party whose behavior was the
final cause of the work stoppage. 30 Injection of this subjective fault
standard into the determination of eligibility for benefits requires the
unemployment compensation authorities to make an individual reso31
lution of each claim.

Supporters of Pennsylvania's distinction between strikes and
lockouts for determining eligibility label it a "distinct step forward
because it promotes rational rather than a power-dominated approach
to the problem." 2 Others assert that failure to distinguish between
strikes and lockouts enhances employers' bargaining strength by adding another weapon to their arsenal. 3 One commentator claims that
the lockout-strike distinction is a natural one, that unemployment
compensation benefits are not strike or lockout benefits but payments
to alleviate the burdens of unemployment, and that a state that denies
benefits by refusing to make the distinction is not remaining neutral
in the labor-management power relationship. 4
Opponents of the Pennsylvania approach argue that the unwillingness of American courts, based partially on the British experience,
to allow benefits when a worker is in any way connected with a labor
dispute accords with the basic purpose of compensation for involuntary unemployment. 5 Others claim that differentiating strikes and
lockouts and evaluating fault are impossible tasks and that states
attempting to make such distinctions acquire an artificial definition of
28. Miller v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 315, 321, 31
A.2d 740, 743 (1943).
29. Ostensibly states that pay unemployment benefits when a lockout is determined do not examine the merits of the dispute that caused the work stoppage. These
states allegedly look only to the final cause of the work stoppage. This allows them to
argue that they are not interfering with the bargaining process. See Comment,
Unemployment Compensation-Effects of the Merits of a Labor Dispute on the
Right to Benefits, 49 MICH. L. REV. 886 (1951).
30. Morris v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 564, 568,
83 A.2d 394, 297 (1951).
31. For a discussion of the changing position of the Board of Review on the
subjective fault test and on evolution of the present test, see Wagner, Unemployment
Benefits in Labor Disputes, 53 DICK. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1949); Dep't of Labor &
Indus. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 421, 426-27, 65 A.2d
436, 439, rev'd on other grounds, 362 Pa. 342, 67 A.2d 114 (1949).
32. T. BRODEN, LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE §
9.03, at 368 (1962).
33. Fierst & Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 YALE
L.J. 461, 480-81 (1940).
34. Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE LJ.
167, 172-76 (1945).
35. Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L.
REv. 668, 695 (1958).
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lockout.8 6 One author concludes that exclusion of lockouts from the
'8 7
definition of labor dispute is "distortion rather than definition.
Pennsylvania has adopted a position both difficult to understand
and difficult to justify. While ostensibly not exploring the merits of a
labor dispute when determining eligibility for benefits, 88 administrative personnel 9 using the fault standard to distinguish strikes from
lockouts must examine carefully both sides of a labor dispute unless
the distinction is to be mechanically and irrationally applied."
Possibly in response to this anomalous situation and the criticism
of its minority position, Pennsylvania has refined its fault test:
Have the employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert a work stoppage pending final settlement
of the contract negotiations; and has the employer agreed to permit work to continue for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms
and conditions of employment pending further negotia41

tions?

This offer-and-acceptance test, which has been consistently followed
since its enunciation,4 2 may appear to be easily applied. The redefined
fault standard, however, still requires a determination of the merits of
a labor dispute by state administrative agencies. 43 It is exactly this
state involvement in collective bargaining and labor disputes that has
led employers to challenge the lockout exception.
36. Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification - A Primer and Some Problems, 8 VAND. L. REv. 338, 366-67, 369 (1955).
37. Shadur, supra note 9, at 302. The Manpower Administration of the United
States Department of Labor has found that the labor dispute disqualification is not
intended to penalize workers whose unemployment is voluntary. On the contrary,
labor dispute participants are excluded from unemployment benefits to maintain the
neutrality of the state and to avoid large incursions in unemployment compensation
funds. Manpower Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws 4-10 (3d rev. ed., Sept. 1, 1973).
38. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra; Wagner, Unemployment
Benefits in Labor Disputes, 53 DIcK. L. REV. 187, 193-94 (1949).
39. Under the Pennsylvania statute the local Bureau of Employment Security
office makes initial determinations of eligibility; claimants have a right of appeal to
an unemployment compensation referee and the Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 821-32 (Supp. 1975).
40. See Comment, Unemployment Compensation-Effects of the Merits of a
Labor Dispute on the Right to Benefits, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 886 (1951).
41. Erie Forge & Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 400 Pa.
440, 444-45, 163 A.2d 91, 93 (1960).
42. Philco Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 430 Pa. 101, 104,
242 A.2d 454, 455 (1968); United States Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 6, 8, 321 A.2d 399, 400 (1974); Toma v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 38, 42, 185 A.2d 201, 204
(1971).
43. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.

m. Federal Challenges
Fifteen states including Pennsylvania exclude lockouts from the
labor dispute disqualification in their unemployment compensation
laws."' In addition, two states grant unemployment benefits after a
prescribed waiting period to otherwise eligible persons who are unemployed because of a strike or other labor dispute.45
Rhode Island's statutory provision was the first to be challenged
for granting unemployment benefits to strikers;"6 although the first
two challenges4 7 proved unsuccessful, it has remained a fertile source
of litigation. In Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett4 8 the court decided that the
statute was not intended to impinge directly or indirectly on federal
bargaining rights. Rather, the act was found to be an exercise of the
police power to promote general welfare. 49 The court discerned no
intent to override state welfare statutes in the congressional allocation
of power between labor and management in the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).50 Moreover, the effects on collective bargaining of granting unemployment benefits to strikers were said to be
"speculative and limited." 1
The third challenge to the Rhode Island provision, Grinnell
Corp. v. Hackett, 2 alleged that the statute conflicted with policies
expressed in the LMRA and, thus, violated the supremacy clause5" of
the Constitution. The district court in Grinnell, relying partially on
Almacs 54 and partially on ITT v. Minter,5 5 found the issue proper for
resolution by Congress and not the courts. It then dismissed the
complaint, following the police power-general welfare rationale used
in Almacs5 6 The First Circuit reversed the district court, however,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.5 7 Chief Judge Coffin,
author of the Minter opinion, found that the preemption issue was
44. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah,
and West Virginia.
45. N.Y. LAOR LAw § 592(1) (McKinney 1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 2844-16 (1968). New York provides benefits after seven weeks, Rhode Island six.
46.
ITr v. Carter, CiVil No. 3770 (D.R.I., Apr. 6, 1967). The district court
refused the employer's prayer for injunction and dismissed the complaint after
superficially examining the employer's preemption and interference with collective
bargaining contentions.
47. Almacs, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970); ITT v. Carter,

Civil No. 3770 (D.R.I., Apr. 6, 1967).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970).
Id. at 967-68.
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, §§ 151-68, 49 Stat. 449.
312 F. Supp. at 968.
344 F. Supp. 749 (D.R.I. 1972).

53.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

54.

312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970).

55. 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971); see notes
70-76 and accompanying text infra.
56.

344 F. Supp. at 754.

57.

475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
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justiciable"' and that Congress was not the only forum for its resolution.5 9 Although stating that a detailed evidentiary foundation would
be necessary to treat this complex preemption issue, 60 the court found
the employer's complaint a valid claim for relief."O
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor6 2 employees laid off from
interim employment during a strike against Dow were awarded benefits charged to Dow's unemployment compensation account. 63 The
court refused to leave resolution of the case to Congress. It recognized
that the gravamen of the complaint was infringement of federal
collective bargaining rights by the state.6 4 The defendants were ordered to refrain from charging benefits paid against Dow's unemployment compensation account. Discovery and other trial preparations
were allowed to proceed. 65
The Michigan unemployment compensation law was assailed
again in Holland Motor Express, Inc. v. Michigan Employment Security Commission.61 The employer in this case contended that the
state's distinction between lockouts and strikes violated equal protection; its inconsistency with the legislative intent of the NLRA was said
to violate the supremacy clause. The state court found a rational basis
for the classification and held that the employer had failed to meet its
burden of showing an irrational classification to overcome the statute's presumed validity.67 On the preemption issue the court upheld
the statute, reasoning that (1) unemployment compensation payments are not made by the employer, but by the state; (2) lockouts
are not expressly protected by the NLRA; and (3) the NLRA
58. Id. at 453.
59. Id. at 453-54.
60. Id. at 459. Required evidence was said to include statistical data showing
the relationship between receipt of public benefits and length and cost of strikes, size

and nature of affected industries, past labor-management relations and prior strike
history, cost of living, and other "economic peculiarities" in affected areas. The court
also felt it would have to consider secondary economic and social effects of the

payment of benefits or their absence, such as violence in labor disputes and economic
stagnation, and expert testimony and statistics on the impact of benefits on industry
pricing, competitiveness, and consumer demand. Id. at 461.
61.

Id. at 460-61.

62. 57 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
63. Michigan provides the lockout exception to its labor dispute disqualification. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.513 (1968). In this case the Michigan Employment
Security Commission determined that interim employment terminated disqualification
of the employees. See Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. Michigan Employ. Sec. Comm'n,
381 Mich. 249, 161 N.W.2d 14 (1968).

64.
65.

57 F.R.D. at 107.
Id. at 108-09.

66.
67.

42 Mich. App. 19, 201 N.W.2d 308 (1972).
42 Mich. App. at 31, 201 N.W.2d at 312.

evidences no congressional intent to invalidate state statutes promoting public health and safety. 68 Although the court's equal protection
rationale is sound, its analysis of the supremacy issue begs the question. To say that the employer suffers no financial detriment from
payment of benefits because the state makes the payments is only
semantic footwork: the state payments are funded by employers'
taxes.69 Furthermore, the absence of clear congressional intent does
not indicate positive congressional approval.
In ITT v. Minter 70 employers sued to enjoin state welfare officials from paying benefits to striking employees. 71 The First Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief on grounds that
the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm to themselves by
payment of benefits and failed to demonstrate sufficient probability of
success on the merits.7 2 After noting kinds of data that might be
determinative of the preemption question, 3 the circuit court declared
Congress to be the preferable forum for its resolution. 74 Judge Coffin
claimed not to attribute significant weight to congressional silence. He
also doubted that the Massachusetts welfare scheme significantly
frustrated federal bargaining policy. 75 The court concluded by distinguishing unemployment and welfare benefits, declaring that the supposed unavailability of the former to strikers in Massachusetts had no
bearing on the availability of the latter.70
Payment of unemployment benefits to strikers also has been
challenged in Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations.77 An employer sought to enjoin
enforcement of the state unemployment compensation law, 8 which
Hawaiian courts had interpreted to allow payment of benefits to
strikers when their employer's business was not totally shut down by
the strike. 79 The federal district court recognized the possibility of a
supremacy clause violation in the state's interference with a labor
68.
69.
70.

42 Mich. App. at 28-31, 201 N.W.2d at 313-14.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.513 (1968).
435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971); see Clark,
Welfare for Strikers: ITT v. Minter, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 79 (1971).
71. Although the case dealt with welfare benefits, not unemployment compensation, it is included because of its similarity to other cases discussed and because the
Grinnell court relied on it. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 344 F. Supp. 749, 751 (D.R.I.
1970).
72. 435 F.2d at 991.
73. The court stated that its determination would rest on several factors: the
impact of benefits paid to strikers on collective bargaining; the number of states
paying welfare benefits to strikers; the effect of benefits on strike duration; the effect
of benefits on strikers' resolve; the amount of welfare benefits vis-a-vis strike benefits;
"and a host of other factors." Id. at 993.
74. Id. at 993-94.
75.

Id. at 994.

76.
77.

Id. at 994-95.
378 F. Supp. 791 (D. Hawaii 1974); see editor's note p. 70 supra.

78.

HAwAII REV. STAT.

§ 383-29 (1968).

79. Meadow Gold Dairies v. Wiig, 50 Hawaii 225, 437 P.2d 317 (1968).
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dispute. The employer's prayer for a preliminary injunction was
granted,"0 the court placing considerable emphasis on Super Tire
EngineeringCo. v. McCorkle.8 '
Employers in Super Tire brought an action in New Jersey for
declaratory and injunctive relief against state welfare officials to end
payment of welfare benefits to strikers.8 2 The district court, relying on
Minter,"' held that Congress was the appropriate forum for resolution
of the plaintiffs' claims and dismissed the complaint.8 4 The court of
appeals remanded without reaching the merits and instructed the
5
district court to dismiss for mootness because the strike had ended.
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari"6 on the mootness
issue, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.8 7 Finding that the employers' claim that New Jersey
welfare laws interfered with the LMRA policy of free collective
bargaining deserved a hearing, the Court said, "The judiciary must
not close the door to the resolution of the important questions these
concrete disputes present."8 8
In light of this decision it appears that the courts in Hawaiian
Telephone8 9 and Dow Chemical" were correct in hearing the employers' claims. At the same time, however, Judge Coffin's empirical
evidence requirement stated in Grinnell,9' although a distinct step
forward from Minter,92 effectively insures that employers will not
prevail on the merits. A recent decision of the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v.
9 3 in which a challenge based on
Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania,
the lockout-strike distinction and federal preemption was decided
adversely to the employer, supports this view.
Negotiations between Sun Oil's Marcus Hook refinery and the
Refinery Workers Union failed to produce a new agreement before
80.

378 F. Supp. at 797-98.

81. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
82. General assistance is provided by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-107 (1974), aid
to families with dependent children (AFDC) by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-1 (1974).

Interpretive regulations can be found at 416 U.S. 118 n.4 (1974).
83.

435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970).

84. See 469 F.2d 911, 913 (3d Cir. 1972).
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 922.
414 U.S. 817 (1973).
416 U.S. at 127.
Id.

89. 378 F.Supp. 791 (D.Hawaii 1974).
90. 57 F.R.D. 105 (E.D.Mich. 1972).

91.

475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).

92. 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970).

93. -

Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 338 A.2d 710 (1975).

expiration of the existing contract. The parties then agreed to continue working on a day-to-day basis. Five weeks later a bargaining
impasse was certified by the federal mediator, at which time the company began implementing its contract proposals. 94 The union notified its members that a better offer had been rejected by Sun Oil
employees at another refinery, a strike vote was taken, and a work
stoppage resulted. Both the Board9" and the court 96 found that a
lockout had occurred, reasoning that the union's agreement to a dayto-day contract extension was a peace gesture that the company upset
by implementing its contract proposals. The court held that the
reasonableness of continuing the status quo, rather than the length
of its continuance, was controlling.9 7 Sun Oil did not show that implementation of its proposals was essential to continued operation. 98
Therefore, its action was declared unreasonable and the work stoppage a lockout.99
The court neatly sidestepped the crucial issue of federal preemption. Although it recognized lockouts as legitimate bargaining weapons,' 00 the court nevertheless cited cases' 01 decided prior to Super
Tire' as authority for its conclusion that "persuasive evidence" is
required to show preemption. 10 3 Language in Super Tire stating that
preemption claims of this nature must be afforded a judicial hearing
and the proper application of Super Tire in Hawaiian Telephone'
were ignored by the commonwealth court, which found Sun Oil's
argument plausible but lacking evidentiary support. 0 5 The police
power rationale and the act's declaration of public policy' 0 6 led the
court to conclude that "the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law is not designed or intended to restrict or to regulate labor
activity developed under the federal law."' 0 7 Unfortunately, the crux
94. Proposals implemented concerned vacation pay, service, seniority, and
distribution of overtime. Id. at -, 338 A.2d at 712.

95.

Sun Oil Co., No. B-122198 (Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, June 21,

1974).

96.
97.
98.
163 A.2d
99.
100.

-

Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at -, 338 A.2d at 713.

Id. at -, 338 A.2d at 713.
See Hershey Estates v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 400 Pa. 446,
535 (1960).
- Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at -, 338 A.2d at 714.
Id. at-,
338 A.2d at 715.

101. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973); ITT v. Minter,
435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970).
102. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
103. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at-,
338 A.2d at 717.
104. 378 F. Supp. 791 (D. Hawaii 1974).
105. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at -, 338 A.2d at 717.
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 752 (1964).
107. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at -, 338 A.2d at 714. A similar challenge was
raised recently in Borger Steel Co. v. Smith, Civil No. 74-636 (M.D. Pa., filed Aug.
5, 1974). On facts like those in Sun Oil, an employer is seeking to have Pennsylvania's lockout exception declared unconstitutional. The complaint alleges as follows: the
exception deprives the employer of its federally guaranteed right to bargain collective-
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of the preemption question, the effect of the act on federal labor
policy, was overlooked.
IV.

Issues and Arguments

The overriding congressional purpose in enacting unemployment
insurance legislation was to combat the severe hardships of unemployment during cyclical depressions.108 Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions"°9 have interpreted this purpose to include a voluntariness
test: the law is intended to benefit only involuntarily unemployed
persons." 0 This construction required Pennsylvania courts to read the
introductory fault provisions of the act'
into the labor dispute
disqualification provision, 1 2 an interpretation not originally intended.
The state's police power allows it to make appropriate regulations for
the health, safety and welfare of its people;" 3 unemployment compensation laws fall into this category. Moreover, such laws were
designed to be state administered." 4 Nevertheless, a question arises:
Consistent with employers' federal rights and with congressional intentions in enacting federal labor laws, may the state make fault (i.e.,
lockout-strike) determinations in administration of unemployment
compensation statutes?
A.

The Neutral State

The labor dispute disqualification is often said to allow the state
to remain neutral. 1 5 This rationale presumably was derived from
Great Britain's National Health Insurance Act of 1911,"6 which
ly with its employees; it contravenes the supremacy clause; and it deprives the
employer of a legitimate bargaining tool, the lockout. Plaintiff's Complaint at 4-5.
108. H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935).
109. See note 44 supra for other jurisdictions that apply the lockout exception.
110. See Department of Labor & Indus. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
148 Pa. Super. 246, 248, 24 A.2d 667, 668 (1942).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (1964):
Security against unemployment and the spread of indigency can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employees during periods when they become
unemployed through no fault of their own.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d) (1964).
113. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
114. H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 615,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1935).
115. Shadur, supra note 9, at 196-97; Haggart, Unemployment Compensation
During Labor Disputes, 37 NEa. L. REv. 668, 688 (1958).
116. 1&2Geo. 5, c. 55.

served as a model for many American social security laws. 11"7 Just as
payment of unemployment benefits to strikers is labeled a wrongful
subsidy of employees in a labor dispute, 1 8 so is denial of benefits said
to confer a considerable advantage upon management. 11 9 Both are
thought to violate state neutrality. A theoretical lack of neutrality;
however, does not justify the state's support of one side in a labor
dispute at the expense of the other. A primary motive for federal
labor legislation has been to foster equality of bargaining strength
between labor and management, with the hope that equality will
foster industrial peace.' 2 ' Once this equality has been achieved or
approximated, the state must not interfere in the collective bargaining
process. Indeed, one argument raised in recent challenges declares
such state action preempted by federal laws governing labor-management relations.
B.

Preemption

Preemption has its roots in the supremacy clause of the Constitution 2 ' and is a necessary adjunct to federalism in the adjustment of
power between the states and the national government. This judicially
created doctrine 2 2 is designed "to avoid conflicting regulations of
conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority
over the subject matter."'' Preemption in the area of federal versus
state labor statutes was first formulated into a rule of general application in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.12 4 In that case
the Supreme Court harmonized several previous labor preemption
decisions' 2 5 and established the rule that when activities are "arguably
protected" by section 7 of the NLRA 1 6 or "arguably prohibited" by
117. See In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wash. 2d 204, 208, 130 P.2d 64,
66 (1942), which states the general rule of statutory construction that a statute

adopted from another jurisdiction presumably carries the construction given it in the
other jurisdiction.
118. Holland Motor Express, Inc. v. Michigan Employ. Sec. Comm'n, 42 Mich.
App. 19, 28, 201 N.W.2d 308, 312 (1972).
119. Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J.

167, 175 (1946).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
121.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2, which reads,

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made

in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
122. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 174, 186

(1971).
123. Id. at 285-86.
124. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
125. The prior cases, their background, and a thorough analysis of preemption in
this context are found in Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HAv.L. REV.
1337 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cox].

126.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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section 8(b),' 2 7 only the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
may deal with them. 1 8 This test was questioned by members of the
Court in 1970,129 but was reaffirmed one year later in Amalgamated
Association of Street Employees v. Lockridge." ° The continuing
validity of the Garmon test' is unimportant to this discussion because the issues raised in recent cases place them outside the Garmon
rule. This fact was recognized in Minter,"2 the first case in which
preemption was raised in the context of granting public benefits to
labor dispute participants.1 3 Administration of state unemployment
compensation laws does not "arguably" fall within section 7 or 8 of
the NLRA; thus the preemption issue must be decided in a nonGarmon context.
The starting point for finding preemption is congressional intent.
Concerning payment of unemployment benefits in labor disputes,
however, no clear evidence of congressional intent to preempt state
action exists. In 1947 the House passed the Hartley bill,"3 which
redefined employee to exclude strikers that accepted unemployment
benefits. A House resolution declared that a state law allowing payments to strikers after a waiting period was "clearly a perversion of
the purposes of the Social Security Laws.""' 5 This statement, however, was dropped without explanation in conference committee." 6 In
1969 President Nixon proposed to Congress that states deny unemployment benefits to strikers. 13 7 The Ways and Means Committee
deleted the provision 138 and the House passed a substitute bill without
additional discussion." 9 Senate debate on the bill did not mention the
127.

Id. § 158(b).

128. 359 U.S. at 244-46.
129. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Stewart questioned its validity
in Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Ship. Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), and

Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
130. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
131. Lockridge was a five-four decision; two members of the majority, Justices
Harlan and Black, are deceased.

132.
133.
134.

435 F.2d 989, 992 (1st Cir. 1970).
Id. at 991.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).

135. H.R. REP. No. 353, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947).
136. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
137. Message from President Nixon, Hearings on H.R. 12625 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1969).
138. Chairman Mills said, "If the state wants to do it, we believe they ought to
be given latitude to enable them to write the program they want." 115 CoNG. REc.
34106 (1969).

139.

H.R. 14705, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

issue; neither the conference report 140 nor final debate' 4' raised the
question.
On the other hand, support for payment of unemployment benefits to strikers and, by inference, for the right of states to make a
lockout-strike distinction is found in the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act, 1 42 which allows payment of unemployment benefits to
strikers. Under this act employees are disqualified from benefits only
4
when they are engaged in an unlawful strike against carriers.1 1
Additionally, the program,'
whose eligibility standards are established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1 45 permits
unemployment assistance to strikers in the twenty-four participating
46
states.
Congressional intent in this area is unclear. Although Congress
can specifically provide for preemption, 47 no action has been taken
and none is likely. Changes in federal labor law are always controversial and are enacted only after substantial public pressure has been
exerted. 4 ' The lack of clear congressional intent, however, should
not prevent courts from deciding important questions raised by introduction of public benefits into labor disputes.
Even without clear congressional intent to preempt state action,
courts will invalidate state laws whose administration "palpably infringes" upon federal labor policy.' 4 9 To make this finding the First
Circuit in Minter' ° and Grinnell'5 ' has required presentation of
empirical data. This demand is said to be justified because these
cases attempt to apply preemption in a "most unusual circumstance."'152 On the other hand, the Dow Chemical5 court did not
raise the empirical evidence requirement. Rather, it viewed the supremacy issue as a mixed question of law and fact. 5 4 This latter view
has gained some ascendancy over the stringent empirical requirements established by the First Circuit and followed in Pennsylvania in
Sun Oil.'5 5 The Supreme Court in Super Tire' 56 indicated that the
140.

CONF. REP. No. 1037, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

141.

House:

142.

Senate: 116 CONG. R c. 27305-23 (1970).
45 U.S.C. §§ 351-67 (1970).

143.

Id. § 354(a-2)(iii).

144.
145.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970).
Id. § 602.
See THIEBLOT & COWIN, supra note 1, at 240-51.
Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943).
Cox, supra note 125, at 1377.
Southern Pac. Term. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
435 F.2d 989, 994 (1st Cir. 1970).
475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).

152.

Id. at 461.

153.
154.

57 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
Id. at 108.

155.

-

156.

416 U.S. 115 (1974).

146.

116 CONG.REc. 15608-17 (1970).

Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,

338 A.2d 710 (1975).
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empirical data requirement may be avoided by taking judicial notice
of the effect of public benefits on labor disputes and the bargaining
process. The Court stated,
It cannot be doubted that the availability of state welfare assistance for striking workers in New Jersey pervades every work
stoppage, affects every existing collective-bargaining agreement,
and is a factor
lurking in the background of every incipient labor
57
contract.'
This principle applies equally to the availability of unemployment benefits in a labor dispute. Relying on Super Tire, the court in
Hawaiian Telephone'5 8 adopted this view and granted an employer
preliminary relief by enjoining operation of a state law granting
unemployment benefits to strikers." 9 Similarly, Pennsylvania's payment of benefits to employees declared to be locked out pervades
every collective bargaining contract and the bargaining process it160
self.
Professor Archibald Cox' 6 ' has suggested a broader test of
preemption than the "arguably prohibited or protected" test of Garmon.'6 2 His test applies federal preemption to employee organization, collective bargaining, and use of economic weapons -to secure
bargaining objectives." 3 Cox sees two fundamental tenets in national labor policy: freedom of employees to organize and voluntary
private adjustment of conflicts over wages, hours, and conditions of
employment through administration and negotiation of collective bargaining contracts. 64 Interplay of these forces leads to strikes, boycotts, lockouts, and other forms of economic pressure. Any state
restriction on the objectives or forms of these pressures tips the scale
toward one side or the other, upsetting the balance carefully established by Congress. 6 5 Cox's expanded preemption test was acknowledged by the First Circuit in Grinnell and found to be similar
to the preemption test used by that court in non-Garmon cases.' 6 6
The expanded preemption test, however, would not relieve the
6 7
court's heavy empirical data requirement.1
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 124.
378 F. Supp. 791 (D. Hawaii 1974).
Id. at 798.

160.

See notes 186-201 and accompanying text infra.

161.

Samuel Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University.

162.

359 U.S. 236 (1959).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Cox, supra note 125, at 1339.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1352-53.
475 F.2d 449, 461 n.13 (1st Cir.1973).
Id.

A preemption test that fails to recognize that public benefits are
a critical factor in labor disputes and collective bargaining is unnecessarily restrictive and unfair to employers. Federal labor laws have
made adjustments in the power relationship between labor and management. If states engage in a similar balancing and weighing process
in determining whether unemployment benefits should be provided or
denied, they encroach on the federal domain. The labor dispute
disqualification in unemployment compensation laws harmonizes that
area of state law with federal labor statutes. By redefining labor
dispute to exclude lockouts, as in Pennsylvania, and then determining
whether a strike or lockout has occurred in each case, the state
destroys the balance struck by Congress by further burdening the
employer.
A state cannot add to an employer's federal bargaining obligations in collective bargaining even though nothing in Section 7
protects any employer activities and N.L.R.B. decisions conclusively demonstrate that the particular conduct which the state
would regulate is not arguably prohibited by Section 8(a). 168
Depriving employers of lockouts as bargaining tools-and that is the
effect of unemployment statutes that provide benefits to locked out
employees-clearly adds to their bargaining obligations. Moreover, a
requirement of substantial empirical data or persuasive evidence to
find preemption effectively denies employers the judicial hearing on
the merits mandated by Super Tire. 6 9
C.

Deprivationof FederalRights
To argue that Pennsylvania's statutory scheme of unemployment
compensation deprives employers of a legitimate economic weapon,
the lockout, one must show that the lockout is a federally protected
right, that it is "the corollary of the strike.'

17

'

At common law the

weapon.1 71

lockout was a legitimate economic
Senator Wagner originally intended to make the lockout an unfair labor practice under
section 8(1) of the Wagner Act, 1 72 but this effort failed. Indeed, the
17
equality of strikes and lockouts was recognized during debate. 1
Even if strikes and lockouts did not enjoy equality before 1947, the

Taft-Hartley Act 1 74 made them equal in its effort to restore equality

between employers and employees. 1 75 This view received support by its
168. Cox, supra note 125, at 1365.
169. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
170. See Lewis, The "Lockout as Corollaiy of Strike" Controversy Reexamined,
23 LAB. L.J. 659 (1972).
171. Iron Molders Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 50 (7th Cir. 1908);
"[E]mployers may lock out (or threaten to lock out) at will ....
172. S. 2926, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1934).
173. 79 CONG. REC. 7673 (1935) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
174. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
175. Denbo, Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strike?, 14 LAB. L.J. 400,
402-03 (1963).
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adoption in the Restatement of Torts. 7 6 Yet, the NLRB consistently
held that lockouts during negotiations infringed upon section 7 rights
of employees, violated section 8(a)(1), and constituted discrimination prohibited by section 8(a)(3).77
In 1956 permissible use of lockouts was expanded in Buffalo
Linen."8 One member of a multiemployer bargaining unit had been
struck; others in the unit locked their employees out. The Supreme
Court held that this lockout was not a violation of section 8(a)(1) or
(a)(3), since it was used to defend against pressure that would result
in employer capitulation if each member were struck individually. 1 79
A 1965 case not only expanded coverage of legal lockouts, but also
invalidated the Board policy of nonrecognition of single employer
bargaining lockouts. In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB' the
Court held that an employer violates neither Section 8(a)(1) nor
Section 8(a)(3) when it temporarily locks out employees after a
bargaining impasse' 8 ' to pressure them in support of a legitimate
bargaining position. 81 2 Although the Court did not declare the lockout the corollary of a strike, its decision lends support to the concept
of equality between the two actions. In fact, since the American Ship
decision, the Sixth Circuit has taken this final step by holding the
lockout to be the corollary of employees' right to strike. 183
Under federal law, therefore, an employer may use a lockout
after a bargaining impasse without committing an unfair labor practice if it seeks only to support a bargaining position and is not
motivated by antiunion animus.' 8 4 Under Pennsylvania law, however,
an employer that resorts to the lockout must pay its employees
unemployment benefits to engage in such activity. In most state
176. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 787, comment a (1939).
177. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.LR.B. 334, 337 (1958). Certain
exceptions, in which lockouts were permitted, were carved from this general rule: to
prevent plant seizure by sitdown strike, Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940); to
prevent repeated disruption by quickie strikes, International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
907 (1951); to prevent spoilage of materials that would result from an unannounced
strike, Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943); to prevent customer dissatisfaction, Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.LR.B. 168 (1951).
178. NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
179. Id. at 97.
180. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
181. For the importance and construction of the term "impasse" in negotiations
and disputes, see Epstein, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 769
(1966).
182. 380 U.S. at 318.
183. Detroit News. Pub. Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1967).
184. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1965); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).

unemployment compensation plans the labor dispute disqualification
includes both lockouts and strikes. The federally created labor-management relationship is not affected by these laws. Contrast the effect
of Pennsylvania's statute and others that exempt lockouts from the
labor dispute disqualification. Should the employer decide to lock out
its employees after a good faith effort at compromise fails, it is
charged with the amount of unemployment compensation paid during
the dispute and its future contributions to the fund are increased. In
short, these states greatly limit employers' exercise of nonproscribed
activity and effectively prohibit lockouts altogether for those employers unable or unwilling to pay the benefits awarded. The former
Board policy of treating lockouts as illegal arguably may have justified state restrictions on lockouts. In light of Supreme Court decisions
rejecting that view, 18 5 however, such legislation cannot stand.
D.

Effect on the BargainingProcess

The effect on the collective bargaining process of state unemployment compensation laws that grant benefits to strikers or make a
lockout-strike distinction and award benefits to locked out employees
provides another compelling reason for invalidating this type of statutory provision. The state has an interest in free and untrammeled
collective bargaining for both employers and employees.' 8 6 At the
heart of the federal plan for unfettered collective bargaining in the use
of economic sanctions."8 7 The right to bargain collectively "does not
entail a 'right' to insist on one's position free from economic disadvantage."'18 8 On the contrary, collective bargaining is a power relationship between employers and employees. 9 Congress has attempted to
insure equality between the opposing sides as the starting point for
bargaining'9 ° and has made necessary adjustments. 9 ' Both sides
being equal, therefore, any agreement should be reached through
bargaining strength of the parties, not through government interference.' 92 Federal labor policy is not designed to compel agreement,
185. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1965); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).
186. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 352 U.S. 283, 295 (1959);
Hogan v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 554, 561, 83 A.2d
386, 390 (1951).

187.

See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).

188. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965).
189. See Livernash, The Relation of Power to the Structure and Power of
Collective Bargaining, 8 J. LAw & ECON. 10 (1963).
190. This goal is evident in the purpose of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
191. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Aer (1948).
192. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
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only good faith bargaining."" Freedom in bargaining necessarily
includes the right to reject offers made by the other side. Implied in
that right is a freedom to resort to economic pressures-strikes,
lockouts, and picketing.' "To restrict either the objectives for which
economic pressure can be applied or the forms of pressure which are
permissible tips the scale toward management or union."' 95
The bargaining attitude of each side has been defined as follows:
Cost of disagreeing with Y
X's bargaining attitude
Cost of agreeing on Y's terms 19 6
The availability of unemployment benefits in a work stoppage' 9 7
reduces an employee's cost of disagreeing with the employer, hardens
his resolve to strike and to stay out, and makes him less likely to
negotiate seriously on the employer's proposals.1 9s From the employer's side, the availability of unemployment benefits increases the cost
of disagreeing with the union in bargaining; settlement will likely be
closer to union demands. Employees get a double advantage of
anticipated benefits during bargaining and actual benefits in the event
of a work stoppage. A union that knows the employer cannot pay for
a lockout can afford lo be intransigent at the bargaining table.
Additionally, in lockout exception jurisdictions there is a possibility
that a strike may be declared a lockout by the administrative agency
that pays unemployment benefits.
As counterpart to strikes, employers should have full use of
lockouts to support legitimate bargaining objectives' 9" and to temper
unreasonable union demands. If that employer action is withdrawn or
made so expensive that its use is effectively curtailed, employers lose
their ultimate bargaining weapon and the bargaining process is fundamentally altered in favor of labor. Alteration of the labor-management relationship should be effected only by direct congressional
action, not through administration of state unemployment compensation laws. "Administration is greater than a means of regulation;
193.
(1972).
194.
195.

196.
CARTIER,

197.
198.
(1971).
199.

29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970); NLRB v. Bums Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 283
Cox, supra note 125, at 1353.
Id.
THIEBLOT & COWIN, supra note 1, at 25 n.31. The equation is taken from
THEORY OF WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 117 (1959).
See THIEBLOT & COWIN, supra note 1, app. B.
Clark, Welfare for Strikers: ITT v. Minter, 39 U. CII. L. REv. 79, 105
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).

administration is regulation. 2 °° Clearly Congress does not intend
that states regulate labor relations. 0 1
E.

Mootness

Apart from the allegation of nonjusticiability20 2 of the issues
presented in recent cases, a mootness argument based on the case or
controversy requirement of federal court jurisdiction 20 3 has been
raised. In Super Tire20 4 the Third Circuit vacated the district court's
decision on the merits and instructed the lower court to dismiss the
case for mootness because the strike that prompted the action had
been settled.2 0 5 The Supreme Court found that the issue was not
moot, however, since petitioners were seeking declaratory as well as
injunctive relief.2 0 6 Furthermore, the Court found the possibility of
state action not remote, 20 7 but rather, from the employers' viewpoint,
"immediately and directly injurious to [their] . . . economic positions. 20 s The test employed was whether the issues were "capable of
repetition, yet evading review;"20 9 governmental actions adverse to
employers could be taken "without a chance of redress. 2 10 Since
most strikes are relatively short, the Court found it sufficient that a
"litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect
211
a present interest."
Because the mootness issue is closely tied to that of justiciability,
this Supreme Court decision reinforces the conclusion that cases
challenging the lockout exception and payment of unemployment
benefits to strikers should be heard and decided by the courts. To do
otherwise will "preclude challenge to state policies that have had their
2 12
impact and that continue in force, unabated and unreviewed."
200.

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).

201. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-89
(1972).
202. See notes 55-61 and accompanying text supra.
203. U.S. CONsT. art. HI, § 2, cl.
2.
204. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).

205. 469 F.2d 911, 922 (3d Cir. 1972).
206. 416 U.S. at 121-22.

207. Two cases relied upon by the court of appeals, Oil Workers Union v.
Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960), and Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803 (1954), were
dismissed by the Supreme Court as moot because the strikes that prompted suit had
ended. These cases were distinguished by the Super Tire majority on the basis that

reoccurrence of government action in those cases was so remote and speculative that
no subject matter existed upon which the Court could render judgment, unlike the
operation of New Jersey law in the Super Tire case. 416 U.S. at 122-24.
208. 416 U.S. at 125.

209. Id. at 122, 125.
210. Id. at 122.

211. Id. at 125-26.
212. Id. at 126.
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V.

Conclusion

When the Wagner Act was adopted in 1935,21 organized labor
was not a significant economic force. The act adjusted the labormanagement balance to achieve equality between the parties. Later,
Congress found that too great a shift had been made in labor's favor.
The Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947214 to readjust the balance.
State unemployment compensation laws all contain eligibility
provisions dealing with labor disputes. The great majority exclude
participants in strikes, lockouts, and even jurisdictional disputes from
benefits. This approach comports with the supremacy clause of the
Constitution and causes minimum conflict between state and federal
statutes. Pennsylvania and some other states, however, exclude lockouts from the definition of labor dispute. In so doing, they have
overstepped the bounds of the police power and run afoul of the
supremacy clause. Their action has disrupted the careful balance
between labor and management established by Congress. Regardless
of their altruistic purpose these state laws must yield to federal
preemption of labor relations.
Economic, political, and social conditions have changed since
,the 1930's and 1940's: the power wielded by organized labor is now
as concentrated as that of large corporations. Congress has continued
to monitor and adjust the equality of bargaining strength first addressed by the Wagner Act. Although some may argue that equality
has not been achieved, it is not the province of state legislatures in any
event to alter the balance.
DAVID

213.
214.

Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, §§ 151-68, 49 Stat. 449.
Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
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